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Introduction
Air superiority in itself is not an aim. Its object is to enable airpower to be used correctly and wisely…Air superiority is a necessary evil.
-Maj Gen Mordechai Hod, former Israeli Air Force Commander
Gen William Mitchell wrote in 1925, "The influence of air power on the ability of one nation to impress its will on another in an armed contest will be decisive. Countries conform to the will of their enemies when the penalty for not conforming exceeds the cost of conforming. Cost can be imposed on a state by paralyzing or destroying its strategic and operational base or by actual occupation of enemy territory. In the past, occupation (in the rare instances when it was needed or possible) was accomplished by ground forces-because there was no good substitute. Today, the concept of "air occupation" is a reality and in many cases it will suffice. The Iraqis conformed as much or more with UN demands as the French did with German demands when occupied by millions of Germans. Ground occupation, however, is indicated when the intent is to colonize or otherwise appropriate the enemy's homeland. 3 The author writes this paper on the assumption that air occupation is a viable concept.
American and coalition forces have recently undertaken several operations that one could consider air occupations. Two operations, Provide Comfort and Southern Watch, are being conducted in northern and southern Iraq, respectively, to protect the ethnic populations in these territories. A third operation, Deny Flight, imposed a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina to protect that population. Coalition and alliance forces constructed each of these operations to impose their will over territory. "An occupation may be needed to provide security during humanitarian efforts, when conducting peace support operations, and after major conflicts to provide the transition from hostilities to the desired end state." 4 National Command Authorities tasked the respective Unified
Command's Commanders in Chief (CINCs) to assemble these three operations as a reaction to crises. Due to time constraints, commanders began these operations on an ad hoc basis. Over their duration, units have evolved procedures to conduct effective operations. The lessons learned from these operations will improve current and future operations.
However, forces have not developed formal doctrine and training requirements from their experiences in air occupations. Furthermore, joint publications fail to define or mention the concept of air occupation. The lessons learned from historical experiences should provide the basis for doctrine development. This developed doctrine will enable forces to evolve a strategy for future operations. The strategy will determine the missions that forces will execute in the next air occupation. US Army Field Manual 100-5 states that doctrine sets the direction for modernization and the standard for training. 5 Forces should train for these missions in the peacetime environment because they will not have the time or resources to train during actual operations.
Currently, American air superiority forces continue to train for the worst case scenario, a major regional conflict (MRC). They expect to be able to adjust when authorities task them for one of the more likely scenarios, a lesser regional conflict (LRC). The other 58 plans delineate LRCs. Air superiority employment in a LRC, such as enforcing a no-fly zone over Bosnia, will differ from missions in a MRC, like the Gulf War.
American forces classify the scope of military operations from war to military operations other than war (MOOTW).
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One can consider air occupations MOOTW because they are small scale operations that focus on deterring war and promoting peace.
The majority of air-to-air tasks in a LRC will be in support of MOOTW missions. Current joint doctrine recommends forces obtain proficiency training prior to deployment, if the MOOTW tasks are significantly different from their combat tasks. Therefore, air superiority forces should adjust their training to better emphasize the missions in LRCs.
Thus, doctrine and strategy will determine the missions that air-to-air forces will have to perform in air occupations. Their training will determine how well they execute their missions. "On the day of battle, soldiers and units will fight as well or as poorly as they are trained. Leaders have the responsibility to train subordinates. This may be their most solemn responsibility." 9 American and coalition forces can improve their air superiority in the next air occupation through adherence to a joint air occupation doctrine, proper training, and enhanced equipment. This paper examines a small portion of the air occupation effort, the air-to-air forces. It proposes doctrine for air-to-air forces during an air occupation, reviews the missions resulting from this doctrine, analyzes training requirements, evaluates equipment limitations, and offers solutions. 
Notes

Air-to-Air Doctrine
Considerations
Joint Publication 3-0 states:
When friendly forces can freely impose their will on the enemy, the opponent may have to accept defeat, terminate active hostilities, or revert to other types of conflict such as geopolitical actions or guerrilla warfare. JFCs [Joint Force Commanders] and subordinate commanders consider the nature and type of conflict, the objective of military force, the plans and operations that will most affect the enemy's judgment of cost and risk and the impact on alliance and coalition warfare. If the conditions have been properly set and met for ending the conflict, the necessary leverage should exist to prevent the enemy from renewing hostilities. Moreover, the strategic aims for which the United States fought should be secured by the leverage that US and multinational forces gained and can maintain. Wars are fought for political aims. In developing doctrine for air occupation, one must consider the political environment. In an air occupation, the military force is trying to coerce or enforce the occupied state to do its will. Commanders must maintain an awareness of the political situation in which a force is conducting the air occupation. If a force is conducting an air occupation at the end of hostilities, commanders must protect their own forces as well as 
Proposed Doctrine
The first priority of air-to-air forces in an air occupation is to maintain air supremacy. This will enable other air occupation missions to operate without interference.
American forces have operated with air superiority in every conflict since World War II.
Air superiority operations in an air occupation will consist of a large amount of nontraditional intercepts. The classic fighter versus fighter confrontation will be rare. If the air occupation occurs at the end of hostilities, the occupied force should have a limited fighter threat. However, most countries possess significant numbers of other aircraft, such as helicopters and civilian airplanes. The majority of intercepts in an air occupation will be against these aircraft. These intercepts could occur during the day or at night, and aircrews must be prepared to accomplish them in any environmental conditions.
In an air occupation, an occupying force must maintain sufficient assets in the area to cover all air operations. Initially, fighter aircraft must sanitize the occupied airspace prior to other aircraft conducting air operations. In determining the quantity of air supremacy forces, the commander must consider the airspace size, the number of air operations, and the amount and type of other assets available to assist the air-to-air forces. One primary mission during an air occupation operation will be humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian assistance is one of the main objectives in air occupation missions, because if the people that a force is protecting or supporting fail, then the mission fails. Most humanitarian operations will occur with surface transportation because of reduced costs. However, there are situations when air occupation forces will have to conduct humanitarian efforts from the air. Some examples of these situations are when surface travel to the area in need is not possible due to mine fields, or the threat exists that humanitarian workers will become hostages. Thus, humanitarian efforts will be a major factor in the amount of air operations in the air occupation zone.
If the only air operation on a particular day is an aeromedical evacuation, then the amount of fighters needed for force protection is less than when accomplishing multiple airdrops of food to the population. For example, in Bosnia, C-130s were intermittently air conducting airdrops. Clearly, at times there were more air operations ongoing in theater than there were forces to protect them.
Additionally, each aircraft operating in the area has some self-protection capabilities. In summary, historical events provide references for warfighters to draft doctrine.
Air-to-air doctrine will provide a basis from which forces can develop strategy. The strategy defines the way forces execute their taskings. The taskings that air superiority fighters will have to perform in air occupations are offensive and defensive counter air (OCA and DCA) missions. The OCA sweep and DCA missions will allow unimpeded air operations in a given area for a specified time. In OCA force protection missions, air-to-air forces will have to protect specified airborne objects from aerial attack. The author has provided a more detailed explanation of these missions in Appendix A. In order to properly execute these missions in an air occupation, commanders must effectively train their air-to-air forces.
Chapter 3
Air-to-Air Training Table 1 lists ACC's annual events and requirements for specific GCC levels. Unit commanders determine the requirements for non-specified levels. 
Current Training Requirements
Training Hindrances and Recommendations
In comparing the air occupation air-to-air missions to the training requirements, most of the training requirements will enable a unit to conduct the air occupation mission.
However, there are some areas that hinder the air superiority force's training. These restraints are: an excessive prioritization on sweep, muddling of force protection missions, an inordinate emphasis on point defense, lack of helicopter intercepts, insufficient aircrew ground training, unrealistic ROE practice, and lack of a full-scale exercise.
The first impediment is an overemphasis on sweep. Increasing the force protection missions from four to twelve would allow each pilot to receive an average of one force protection mission a month. While current training requirements require four missions annually, the unit typically accomplishes its annual events in one two-week training period, like a Red Flag exercise. The unit usually does not readdress force protection missions until the next annual cycle. Increasing the requirement from four to twelve would require the unit to accomplish its annual force protection mission events in more than a single two-week training period. Additionally, aircrews beginning their first tour in fighters have normally never participated in a force protection mission. These inexperienced aircrew typically make up fifty percent of a fighter squadron. The current requirement of four force protection missions per year is too low for these young pilots to gain or maintain any proficiency in the mission.
Decreasing the amount of sweep missions from 24 to 16 will still enable each pilot to average over one sweep mission each month. Changing the amount of sweep events will not appreciably reduce overall proficiency in the sweep mission due to the similarities between sweep and DCA area defense missions.
A second training limitation is the lack of specificity on the type of force protection mission. As described in Appendix A, there are three force protection categories: close, detached, and slow mover. In current training requirements, a pilot could fulfill his force protection requirements without having to accomplish a slow mover protection mission.
Force protecting a group of fighters is completely different from protecting C-130s. The speeds, altitudes, routes and self protection will differ significantly. The slow shadow event consists of following an airborne object to report his status, such as a drug runner.
This shadow mission does not include protecting the aircraft from threats. Unless a pilot is able to train and reinforce the lessons learned from tactics manuals, units will have limited force protection mission capabilities. The author recommends that the RTRB further delineate its annual force protection mission requirements into three subcategories: close, detached, and slow mover, with each category requiring four events.
A third training hindrance is the overemphasis of point defense. The point defense mission is a hold over from the Cold War in which air superiority forces defend a specific point, such as an airbase, from attack. There are situations in LRCs when forces would have to conduct point defense missions, such as over a combat search and rescue operation. The likelihood of air superiority forces executing a point defense mission is extremely rare. If one could combine all the air-to-air missions in Operations Provide
Comfort, Southern Watch, and Deny Flight, there was one point defense mission.
However, the probability of commanders tasking air-to-air forces to conduct a HVAA protection mission is extremely high. Therefore, the author recommends the RTRB change its DCA requirements. The annual point defense events should change from 24 to 16, and the HVAA events from 4 to 12.
Changing HVAA protection from 4 to 12 would allow pilots to practice it on average once a month. For training, one would desire an actual HVAA, but it is not required, since any aircraft could simulate the HVAA in training. The increase in HVAA protection events will increase pilots' proficiency for HVAA protection, a scenario they will have to accomplish in both a MRC and a LRC. This will reduce their proficiency in point defense, but there remains a good capability for the aircrews to accomplish the mission. The reduction in point defense events would still enable pilots to train for it more than once a month, and there are some areas of overlap between point and area defense missions.
A fourth training limitation is the lack of helicopter intercepts. The first time many of the pilots executed an intercept on a helicopter in Operation Deny Flight was during actual operations in Bosnia. Helicopters provide some unique intercept problems to fighters because they travel at equivalent speeds with cars and they do not need an airfield to land.
Thus a helicopter flying low over a highway may be difficult to detect. Also, if the helicopter pilot knows of his detection, the pilot can usually land immediately. Annual GCC training requirements include VID intercepts, but the category needs to be more specific to include helicopter intercepts. Of the four day and four night VID intercept events, the author recommends the annual requirements include two helicopter intercepts each for day and night.
The fifth training hindrance does not concern flying training, but rather aircrew The duration of the exercise should be two weeks to account for inclement weather days or range restrictions from higher priority missions.
Equipment Upgrades
In addition to modifying training requirements, a force can increase its air-to-air capability through equipment upgrades. One of the equipment upgrades would be the Therefore, modifying the pilots' training and equipping them with more tools will enhance their mission effectiveness in air occupations. Current training requirements focus on missions that air-to-air forces are less likely to encounter during air occupations.
Training programs should better emphasize the force protection and HVAA missions.
Also, the training programs should better prepare aircrews for helicopter intercepts, VID training, and provide a joint force exercise practicing the air occupation mission.
Additionally, commanders should upgrade aircraft equipment that will increase mission effectiveness in more probable air-to-air missions.
Notes
Conclusion
Without air superiority, you are not going to function… -Gen Ron Fogleman, USAF Chief of Staff
In conclusion, National Command Authorities will task American forces to conduct another air occupation. The lessons of forces in previous air occupations will provide the data to develop air occupation doctrine. An established doctrine, on which forces can base their strategy, will better prepare the forces to successfully execute operations. This doctrine will also provide the basis to adjust training requirements and equipment to become more effective forces. Drafting a notional ROE will allow units to evaluate and refine proposed ROE. Also, it will allow pilots of different aircraft types to validate the ROE with their aircraft unique systems. Effective ROE will help maintain the occupying force's credibility. Additionally, air-to-air forces will be better able to maintain air supremacy with a proper training emphasis on force protection, sweep, and DCA.
Helicopter and improved ground training will further aid air forces. Training and a joint exercise will enable forces to resolve the area size they can effectively cover in an air occupation. Also, training and exercises will help determine the numbers of fighters that commanders need to allocate during dense or sparse air operations and HVAA protection.
Furthermore, training and exercises will determine the amount of air superiority forces based upon the availability of other surveillance assets. Finally, equipment improvements like radar altimeters, NVGs, and SATCOM antennas will give the aircrews more capability to provide air supremacy.
The current operations tempo and monetary constraints limit the amount of training a force can accomplish. American forces will have to conduct the majority of their training from home station. Commanders need to prepare their forces for the worst case scenario.
While there is some overlap in operations between worst case and most likely case scenarios, a force will not be able to effectively accomplish the most likely scenario if it trains exclusively for the worst case scenario. "Readying forces for MOOTW requires building on the primary purpose of the Armed Forces-to fight and win the nation's wars.
For most types of MOOTW, military personnel adapt their warfighting skills to the situation. However, for some MOOTW (for example, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations) warfighting skills are not always appropriate. Therefore, to be effective in these types of MOOTW, a mind set other than warfighting is required." 1 One of the lessons learned and re-learned during military operations is that forces will have to train the way they will fight. Commanders need to adjust the training requirements to enable forces to train for the more likely scenario. The doctrine should be the basis for this training adjustment. LTG T. Montgomery, USA SR MILREP to NATO said, "A well-trained and disciplined military unit is the best foundation upon which to build a peacekeeping force." Appendix A
Air-to-Air Missions
This appendix defines and gives examples of air-to-air missions used in this research paper.
Offensive Counter Air Force Protection
In the force protection role, fighters will protect an airborne object from aerial attack. The advantage of the close force protection role is the fighters always know the location of the object they are protecting, and it is easy to communicate with that aircraft's crew. Additionally, it is easy to adjust to modifications in timing, route, or speed because the package is together. Also, if a threat approaches the asset the fighters can rapidly respond to the threat. The disadvantages of close protection are it concentrates and highlights your assets for a threat. Also, it limits threat response flexibility and restricts the engagement ranges of air-to-air forces because the fighters are visually tied to the objects they are protecting.
Detached force protection provides the fighters more flexibility when reacting to threats, and it does not require the aircraft to remain in one group. However, aircrews need to communicate changes in timing, route, and speed. This communication can be difficult in the low altitude environment because of line-of-sight requirements.
Additionally, if a threat is able to attack the protected aircraft, the fighters will not be able to immediately attack the threat due to their distance.
A combination of close and detached force protection is the preferred method air superiority fighters use to force protect. However, this combination method requires more aircraft than using one force protection method. In determining the amount of air superiority aircraft a joint force possesses, the JFC will probably not have enough aircraft for both a combination force protection mission and other air supremacy taskings.
The slow mover protection presents problems to air-to-air forces because the fighters will typically fly a race track pattern above the slow mover. This causes fighters to turn their back to the threat during the cold leg of the racetrack. One can maintain a thorough radar sanitization in the slow mover's direction of travel by increasing the amount of fighters to always maintain a fighter flying the same direction as the slow mover. Again, this will increase the amount of fighter aircraft required to conduct the mission, which an occupying force may not have due to other requirements.
Sweep
Another mission air-to-air forces will have to execute is an offensive counter air (OCA) sweep mission. This is when air-to-air forces enter a defended area ahead of a strike package to clear the area of enemy air-to-air threats. An example of a sweep mission is a fourship of F-15Cs flying five minutes ahead of a strike package. The timing of a sweep is critical to destroy current airborne threats, and the strike package must employ its ordnance before the enemy has time to launch its reserves. The difference between sweep and detached escort is the air-to-air forces executing a sweep are not tied to protecting a specified group of strikers.
Defensive Counter Air
The defensive counter air (DCA) mission consists of protecting a piece of airspace or an airborne object over your homeland. DCA generally consists of two different missions:
area defense and HVAA protection. The area defense mission is designed to prevent a threat from flying through an airspace and employing ordnance. An example of an area defense mission is four F-15Cs executing a combat air patrol (CAP) defending a 40 square mile area around their base. The other DCA mission, HVAA protection, consists of protecting an expensive airborne object from aerial attack. An example of a HVAA protection mission would be four F-15s protecting an RC-135 aircraft during its mission.
Specialized Tasks
Air-to-air forces will have to accomplish some specific specialized missions. The first mission is a VID intercept. The purpose of a VID intercept is to identify what type of aircraft and force is flying at that location. An example of a VID intercept is an F-15
having to identify a radio inoperative aircraft that returns to base. Base authorities would not know the identity or intentions of the approaching aircraft, and they would need to identify whether the aircraft they are monitoring has hostile or friendly intentions.
An additional specialized mission air-to-air forces will have to execute in an air occupation are night or adverse weather operations. This environment is particularly difficult because of the requirement to rely on instruments for orientation. The overall effectiveness of aerial forces in night or adverse weather will decrease because of the task saturation. A pilot will prioritize flying the aircraft over mission execution. An example of some of the adjustments in this environment would be an F-15 having to execute a VID intercept at night against a non-illuminated airplane. Additionally, night or adverse weather will limit how low fighters will descend because they can not see the ground. The technology exists to enable fighters to descend to low altitude in these conditions.
Appendix B
Summation of ROE Considerations and Proposed Doctrine
The ROE needs to be complete to prevent fratricide, but not unnecessarily conservative that it gives the enemy an advantage.
One important addition to the Joint Publication, in order to take advantage of different aircraft's capabilities, is that some aircraft may be able to operate under a modified ROE.
The first priority of air-to-air forces in an air occupation is to maintain air supremacy.
Commanders must conduct fighter sweeps through the area of operations prior to commencing other air occupation missions.
The airspace size, topography, and aircraft capabilities will determine the amount of air-to-air forces that commanders will need.
The number, type, and spacing of air operations will influence the amount of air-to-air assets needed.
A special interest item in the air operations is the number of High Value Airborne Asset (HVAA) operating within theater.
Another consideration in the number of air-to-air assets required is the amount and type of other assets available to assist the air-to-air forces. 
